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mid the ebb and flow of intel­
lectual fashion, one assertion
steadfastly commands pop­
ular assent: people do not like
lawyers. It is not that people do not
like their own lawyer; he or she may
be a fine citizen and a helpful coun­
selor, nice to family and friends.
Rather, lawyers as a class are
regarded by the public at large as a
necessary evil, as a harbinger of ill.
Nowhere does the dislike for law­
yers manifest itself more than in liti­
gation. Even litigators made over
into litigants share. the popular
dread. Their reasons are the same as
everyone else's. Litigation arises
when all informal means of settle­
ment have failed. For a plaintiff it
means that a stubborn defendant
has left him no alternative but to
sue. For the defendant it means that
the plaintiff has marshalled the
power of the state in aid of a cause
that ought not to be pursued. For
both it means that large sums of
money will be spent to secure a
bigger slice of a shrinking pie. One
side must lose this struggle; often
both do. Inject lawyers into the con­
flict, and normal modes of civility
fail, as each party may use the
other's ingratitude to justify his own
Mr. Epstein is James Parker Hall
Professor of Law.
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questionable conduct. Early in
teaching I received this advice from
a shrewd and experienced lawyer.
"You can tell the sign of a good
deal-everyone leaves the room
happy. You can also tell the sign of
a good settlement-everyone leaves
the room unhappy."
My purpose here is not, however,
to belabor the known truth that liti­
gation is not the road to content­
ment, but rather to pursue two lines
of inquiry: first to seek an explana­
tion for the rapid rise in the fre­
quency of litigation, second to ask
what, if anything, can be done
about it. In discussing these issues
some commentators have attempted
to identify some larger change either
in the social fabric or in personal
mores that could in turn be trans­
lated into an increased propensity to
litigate. The massive increase in liti­
gation, and the bitterness it spawns,
have been attributed to an emerging
claims consciousness in the Ameri­
can public who now reject informal
dispute resolution in favor of litiga­
tion; to the rise of sensationalist
journalism; to an increased level-of
greed fed by the profit system; or
inversely to the decline of religion
and the loss of faith. Alternatively,
Chief Justice Burger has fastened a
large portion of the blame upon
lawyers themselves, for their failure
to act as "healers" in civil litigation.
The illness having been diagnosed,
the remedy remains uncertain. Who
can restructure society at large in
order to control the excesses of liti­
gation? And who can remove from
lawyers the aggressive instincts that
are part and parcel of their craft?
I do not want to deny that the
enormous increase in the level of
litigation over the past generation
has social causes as well as social
consequences. Nor do I want to
deny, as President Derek Bok of
Harvard University has suggested in
a well publicized report, that this
upturn in legal business has diverted
far too great a proportion of nation­
al wealth and talent to legal pur­
suits, to the exclusion of science,
arts and business (I will not add
government to the list). But 1 do
want to argue that the phenomenon
is often misunderstood. Bok is
wrong to see the increase in litiga­
tion as a symptom of an irreversible
social decline. The Chief Justice is
wrong to locate the heart of the
problem in the aggressive instincts
of lawyers.
The sources and the cure of the
present problem may have some­
thing to do with culture in the round
and the character of the legal profes­
sion in particular. But the more
powerful reasons have more modest
and prosaic origins. The current sit­
uation is the regrettable but predict­
able outcome of a large set of dis-
"The repeated
application of the
current legal rules will
leave most people (save
lawyers) worse off than
they otherwise would
have been."
crete social choices about the
substantive and procedural rules
governing litigation. These choices
are often made by courts or legisla­
tures. The net effect of the current
rules has been to drive a wedge
between private gain and the social
good derived from litigation. As the
rules are now structured, individual
plaintiffs may gain from suit while
the society at large will lose. As they
can initiate the process unilaterally,
defendants must then take whatever
private steps will minimize their
losses froin suit. The repeated appli­
cation of the current legal rules will
leave most people (save lawyers)
worse off than they otherwise would
have been. If the rules were restruc­
tured to remove the wedge between
private and social gains, private par­
ties would face higher costs and
realize smaller gains from litigation.
The social problem of excessive liti­
gation would shrink in size, even if
the instincts of lawyers remained as
aggressive as they are today.
The central question of govern­
ance has always been: what institu­
tional arrangements harness the best
that individual self-interest has to
offer while at the same time curbing
its excesses? The common law rules
of procedure were not built on the
assumption that private litigants
acted with a disinterested benevo-
lence toward the opposition. On the
contrary, the concern was that
clever lawyers could prevail not on
the merits of the litigation but on
technical points, surprise, or even
perjured testimony. Indeed, many
of the old rules, like those forbid­
ding parties to testify on their own
behalf, are largely explicable against
a backdrop of pervasive perjury in
testimonial evidence, far beyond the
capacity of cross-examination to
reveal. The old story of the expe­
rienced English barrister tells a good
deal about the foibles of litigation:
"In my youth," the barrister said,
"I lost some cases that I should have
won. Now that I am an experienced
hand, I win some cases that I should
lose. Which goes to show that jus­
tice is done in the long run." Self­
interest, legal intrigue and worse
have long been with us. How could
anyone expect otherwise? The
Romans had a rule that any litiga­
tion between partners automatically
terminated the partnership. Once
the bonds of trust are gone, a rela­
tionship predicated upon trust
cannot survive. Litigation occurs
because informal methods of com­
promise and adjustment have
broken down between parties un­
concerned about maintaining long­
term relationships. Litigation is a
slice of life in which self-interest is
the norm. The legal system must
answer the perennial question of the
political philosophers: How can that
self-interest be harnessed and con­
trolled?
The answer here surely does not
lie either in praise or condemnation
of the adversary system. Every law­
suit is adversarial if it is not collu­
sive. The question is how to modify
the incentive structures in which the
adversaries operate. In this country
the rules as they are now fashioned
guarantee high expenditures in liti­
gation. Once parties are involved in
litigation, they do not act irration­
ally. Quite the opposite is true.
There may be individual cases of
self-destruction, but most cases
settle short of litigation precisely
because both parties can gain by
reducing their litigation costs and
eliminating the uncertainty of all-or­
nothing judgments. Indeed, every
serious study of which I am aware
indicates that once the rules are
taken as a given, the behavior of the
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parties conforms in the aggregate to
the predictions of classical eco­
nomics. I The central tendency is for
litigants to maximize their private
gain, net of their private costs.
"The incentives under.
the American system are
quite the opposite of
those at work in the
Continental systems. "
Moreover, that tendency is not
upset by the occasional account of
self-destructive behavior. The larger
institutional agenda is set by institu­
tional and not anecdotal evidence. 2
The critical questions are systematic,
not personal.
Let us start by examining one pro­
cedural rule: under the American
rules of voir dire parties are allowed
to dismiss potential jurors for cause.
They are also allowed to question
potential jurors extensively to see if
cause exists. Any responsible lawyer
can tell his client that a thorough
voir dire could pay large dividends if
it skews the jury in his favor. The
catch is that the same point is true
for both sides. Each will, examine at
length in order to remove the jurors
it dislikes most, carefully preserving
peremptory challenges for the right
moment. In the end their efforts
largely cancel out. One could get a
'See, e.g., Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A.
Lillard, Settlement out of Court: The
Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims,
12 J. Legal Stud. 345 (1983); William M.
Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts,
14 J. Law & Eeon. 61 (1971); John P. Gould,
The Economics ofLegal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal
Stud. 279 (1973); George L. Priest and
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984).
2See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Rules Without
Reason-the Case of the FTC, Regulation
Sept/Oct 1982 at 20, on the need for
systematic evidence in agency rulemaking.
The same point applies to any effort to
understand institutional behavior. Reliance
on anecdote guarantees biased information.
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jury with about the same degree of
partiality with far lower costs under
the traditional English system (itself
now under attack) in which the judge
conducts voir dire and confines his
attention to relations by blood, mar­
riage and financial interest. The
occasional question by counsel may
be put to the prospective juror
through the judge. Neither side can
spend enormous sums of money
even if it has them. The level of jury
bias will be no greater than under
the American rules, and perhaps less
where skill of counselor financial
resources are unequal. Here the
shape of the legal rules has increased
the costs of the American legal
system.
Consider next an even more fun­
damental point of procedure: the
American rules of cost providing
that each person should bear his
own expenses in litigation, except
under rare circumstances when the
principal claim or defense is wholly
frivolous. The rule in question con­
trasts sharply with the English and
Continental procedures in which the
party who wins is reimbursed his
costs. Indeed, a feature of German
practice carries the basic principle to
its sensible conclusion. Suppose that
a plaintiff claims $10,000 and
receives judgment for only $1,000.
The plaintiff has won, but only 10
percent of the case. He is then
required to reimburse the defendant
for 90 percent of the costs, receiving
in exchange only 10 percent. The net
effect is that the defendant gets 80
percent of his costs from the plain­
tiff, who of course bears his own in
full. The fabulous ad damnums of
American complaints cannot long
survive a rule that exacts its heavy
toll for an erroneous estimation of
either claim or defense. There is no
question that strict rules of cost will
influence behavior. Under the
present system any run-of-the-mill
lawsuit may in principle yield an
enormous verdict, as in the famous
$125,000,000 jury verdict entered
against the Ford Motor Company
for its Pinto in a routine crash­
worthiness case, later reduced to a
still very substantial $3,500,000.3
"Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.
App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). For
Once the ad damnum gives the outer
limit of the loss there is no reason
for a defendant to commit millions
of dollars in order to .save thou­
sands. But the effects of sound rules
on cost go deeper. Since most pri­
vate parties are averse to risk and
fear uncertainty, a rule which makes
the costs of litigation follow the
outcome of litigation will reduce the
level of litigation, and encourage
quicker settlement of the litigation
that does take place.
The incentives under the American
system are quite the opposite of
those at work in the Continental sys­
tems. Now the costs in litigation
that are inflicted on the other side
cannot as a practical matter be
brought back upon the party who
imposes them. Every good trial law­
yer knows the proper way in which
to handle discovery. It is to make a
set of perfectly routine and inexpen­
sive requests that impose intolerable
burdens on the other side.' Discovery
is a way to punish the other side for
resistance, to wear the opposition
down until settlement becomes a
form of surrender. But the catch
again is that the aggressor with the
first round of interrogatories is the
victim of the second. Let the extent
of damage awards increase, and
there is more for both sides to gain
from strategic behavior, and the' cre­
ative use of the legal imagination. In
order to quell this abuse one might
think that some efforts to place
limits on discovery would seem
appropriate. But since the 1938
adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the American sys-
. tem has gone in quite the opposite
direction. Discovery is routinely
done on service of notice to the
opposite party and outside of the
direct supervision of the court. The
scope of the examination is exceed­
ingly broad because the formal rules
of evidence, and the general require­
ment of relevance, do not bind the
parties at this stage of the proceed­
ings. Discovery can be conducted on
any issue calculated to lead to
admissible evidence. The efforts to
control abuse against frivolous
critical commentary, see David G. Owen,
Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages
Against Manufacturers of Defective Pro­
ducts, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1982).
requests depend upon protective
orders sought by the deponents,
which are obtainable only at the dis­
cretion of the trial judges that is
only rarely exercised on a case- by­
case basis.
Those who support the modern
discovery procedure claim that it
allows persons to develop legal
theories based upon the facts. Yet
no amount of data will develop a
theory of a case unless the appli­
cable substantive principles are
themselves independently under­
stood. Discovery is also supposed to
allow each side to probe the strengths
and weaknesses of the adversary's
case. Unfortunately, this benefit
comes at a very high cost, for while
it may yield useful information, it is
also fraught with dangers. Each side
can ransack the files of the opposi­
tion, or tie down its key personnel in
depositions, all as a lever to secure a
more attractive settlement. These
costs may not have been apparent at
the formation of the federal rules,
which were drafted to cover the
ordinary personal injury suit arising
out of an intersection collision,
rather than the complex business
and statutory litigation that has
become standard fare today. The
cost of unsupervised discovery
activities depends heavily on the
nature of the underlying dispute.
Though it may be attractive to let
the facts speak for themselves in
automobile cases, a bit of structure
is more welcome when litigation
examines, say, the hiring practices
of a firm for a period of decades,
when none of the Aristotelian
unities of time, place, and action
define the subject matter of suit.
The relationship between proce­
dure and subject matter in litigation
deserves greater emphasis than it
generally receives. The shift in pro­
cedural laws alone antedates much
of the recent growth in litigation
and cannot therefore solely account
for it. But these procedural reforms
provided a fertile ground for the
onslaught of substantive innova­
tions. One of those changes, undra­
matic but critical, has already been
mentioned: the level of damages
awards has increased far more
rapidly than inflation. As the stakes
of the game get larger, the resources
devoted to playing it have increased
as well. However, two other points
are worth some analysis here. The
first change concerns the relative
decline ofper se rules based on overt
behavior with the parallel rise of
substantive tests that turn either on
the reasonableness of conduct or the
motive of the parties. The second
involves a change in the number of
parties to the litigation. I shall dis­
cuss the points briefly in" turn.
"Perfect justice can only
be done at an infinite
price-which is another
way of saying that it
cannot be done at all. "
One characteristic feature of
many common law rules was that
they gave to private parties "bright
lines" around which they could
organize their behavior, both before
and after litigation. A bright line for
primary conduct indicated what con­
duct could be undertaken without
fear of legal suit, and what conduct
necessarily brought legal action in
its train. The party who trespassed
could be liable for entry; the party
that did not trespass could not. A
single fact was often sufficient to
determine legal liability in the
routine cases. The uncertainty gene­
rated elsewhere (as in killing or
wounding trespassers in defense of
property) occurred with sufficient
infrequency as not to overwhelm the
legal system as a whole. As most
ligitation involved routine cases, the
scope of discovery was thereby
reduced while the certainty of out­
comes was increased.
In sharp contrast, modern rules
tend in quite the opposite direction
since they ordain complex balancing
acts to determine liability. In part
this tendency is justified by the
belief that this fine tuning is neces­
sary in order to eliminate individual
acts of injustice that are not caught
by the general rules. But that hope is
often delusive. Any refinement in
legal rules will increase their error in
application as well as their costs of
administration; at some point the
benefits of precision are over­
whelmed by their costs. Perfect jus­
tice can only be done at an infinite
price-which is another way of
saying that it cannot be done at all.
A willingness to entertain some
tradeoff between simplicity and
aspiration is not only the counsel of
prudence, it is also a precondition
for justice in the broad run of cases.
Nonetheless, the judicial taste for
fine tuning has lately proved irresist­
able. Let me give three examples
drawn from different areas of the
law."
The traditional body of property
law adopted a powerful version of
the ad coelum rule. So long as the
conduct of one person did not
invade (directly or by its physical
consequences) the land of another,
no cause of action followed. 5
Applied to the question of light, the
uniform rule was that it was never
tortious to block the light of a
neighbor, even if (as happened in
the famous dispute between the
Fontainebleau and Eden Roc hotels)
it blocked the sunlight on a neigh­
bor's swimming pool. 6 More recently,
however, the preoccupation with
solar energy has led some courts to
rethink this old position and to
adopt a legal standard (the word is
too flattering) to determine when it
is reasonable for one neighbor to
block the light of another. 7 The rea­
sons announced for the change
stress that light is now used for
"There are also less important illustrations of
an earlier vintage. A 1944 study of recovery
for psychic injury concluded after a detailed
examination of the medical evidence in the
reported cases showed that "Taking all cases
decided between 1850 and 1944, the net
balance of justice would have been greater
had all courts denied damages for injury im­
puted to psychic stimuli alone," given the
rate of error in favor of plaintiffs. See Smith,
Relation ofEmotions to Injury and Disease:
Legal Liability of Psychic Stimuli, 30 Va. L.
Rev. 193, 284-85 (1944).
'See, e.g., Edwards v. Sims, 232 Ky. 791, 24
S.W.2d 619 (1929).
6Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., v. Forty-Five
Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App.
1959).
'Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321
N.W.2d 182 (1982).
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energy purposesand not aesthetics,
or that the social demands for land
development are not as pressing as
they once were. Whatever one
thinks of these reasons, however, it
seems very clear that a great deal




the easement of light than under the
old view, for virtually everything
that touches. on the relevant gains
and losses to both sides is now fair
game for discovery in litigation. A
clean, certain rule
-
is displaced by a
confused and uncertain one. The
costs and frequency of litigation can
only increase, while the gains to the
one litigant are-more than offset by
the 'losses fo the other.:
'The.point may seem small, but in
fact it influences -the relationships
between neighbors in .subdivisions
across the "country. Of greater
importance" however, the retreat
from fixed rules occurs everywhere
throughout the system. Consider the
recent developments in the law of
wrongful discharge. At common
law most agreements could be termi­
nated at will by either side.' Again
the delineation of rights was clear,
and the scope for litigation minor:
who wants 1cflitigate.the question of
whether .the employee was fired?
Today this rtIle is, limited in every
direction:--Sy statutory command it
is undercut in cases where workers
are dismissed for union activities or
because of racial or sexual discrimi­
nation. And at common law it
increasingly has been hedged in by.
rules that insist that all contracts
may be terminated only for cause,
no matter what the private under­
standings." One consequence of this
<:
shift is that scope of litigation neces­
sarily increases. Rights and duties:
turn less on" overt conduct, and
more on motive. Motive itself can
only be established by indirect evi­
dence, and. this in.turn invites dis­
covery on every aspect of individual
and firm 'behavior. Personnel
records for the aggrieved worker are
the obvious place to begin. But any
resourceful lawyer can show the
'See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co.,
81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
9See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114
N.H. 130,316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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relevance of general firm policy; the
treatment of comparable cases within
the firm; the practices in other
firms; the testimony of supervisors
and employers; and the level of pro­
fitability of the firm, and of the
industry at large. Thousands of
pages of relevant information can
be collected and motive may turn in
the end on whether a supervisor pro­
vided the dismissed employee with a
Christmas turkey. The social costs
are enormous, for in addition to the
costs of litigation, retaining one
employee at the very least forecloses
the hiring of a replacement. Where
are the social gains that justify the
pursuit?
One final example: today, actions
for damages by automobile passen­
gers against manufacturers who
produced uncrashworthy vehicles
are commonplace, even though they
were virtually unknown before
about 1968}0 But what are the
standards? Simple compliance with
statute and custom will not exon­
erate the supplier, so reasonableness
tests again become relevant to
examine every stage of the design
and the production process. It is dif­
ficult to attribute any improvement
in product design to a set of legal
doctrines that are so amorphous and
indeterminate as to be utterly useless
in the planning process. Indeed,
much the same can be said about
most of products liability law.
Shortly after its well publicized
bankruptcy, Manville Corporation
published an advertisement in which
it noted that it had tried the issue of
liability in five asbestos cases in the
same court room before five dif­
ferentjuries, II The verdicts, all on
the same evidence, varied from no
liability to punitive damages. How
does anyone respond to such. con­
flicting signals? When this lack of
IOThe seminal case in. t�e line is Larsen, v.
General Motors, 391 F�.2d, 495 (8th Cir.
1968), where the defendant's 'Corvair was' ,
said to be defective in that head-on collision
directed the steering
" column into' the
plaintiff's head. On remand at trial the
defendant won the case, contending that the
plaintiff would have sustained a much more
serious injury had the steering column struck
him in the chest. See Bowman, Defense ofAn
Auto Design Negligence Case, 10 For the
Defense NO.5 (1969).
"N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,1982., §D, at 3.
clear substantive rules is linked to
the modern procedural devices, the
result is inescapable: an increase in
the frequency and severity of litiga­
tion.
"When this lack of clear
'Substantive rules is
linked to the modern
procedural devices, the
result is inescapable; an
increase in the frequency
and severity of
litigation. "
The second major shift in sub­
stantive rules concerns the number
of parties that may be joined in a
single lawsuit. In principle, the
minimum number of parties is two.
Two is also the ideal number because
the complexity of litigation in­
creases exponentially with the num­
ber of parties. In many cases, as
with suretyship litigation, multiple
party suits may be unavoidable. But
today the changes in underlying sub­
stantive theories positively invite a
proliferation of parties. Modern
rules on joint and several liability
allow free suits between codefend­
ants where the jury has broad dis­
cretion in determining the percentage
of loss borne by each. Furthermore,
theories of market share liability
accepted in some states now allow
an injured party who cannot identify
the supplier of a given drug to sue
all the firms that produced it.12 The
12See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588,607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980). Since then even more exotic forms of
liability have been adopted. See, e.g., Collins
v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 Wis. N.W.2d.37 (1984).
adopting what looks like a theory of "risk
creation" in which any company in the
market can be held liable for DES injuries
because of its alleged overall responsibility in
bringing the product to market, wholly with
out regard to its market share. Liability
between producers in the injury is again a
function of an elaborate and indeterminate
set of principles of apportionment. The
decision reads as if administrative costs were
a free good.
relaxation of the rules for class
actions, permissive joinder, and
other procedural devices increase
the likelihood that any given lawsuit
will be a multi-party affair. Perhaps
the best illustration of this is the cur­
rent litigation over the proper con­
struction of the insurance policy
language in the asbestos coverage
dispute. The relevant text of the
policy is only several paragraphs
long." Yet the current litigation in
California has produced discovery
orders against every insurance car­
rier in the litigation, costing millions
of dollars to answer. 14 Simultaneous
depositions now take place daily in
the elusive search for the original
contractual intention, when every
piece of past conduct by every party
may lead to relevant or admissible
evidence. The attractions of the
parol evidence rule, and the con­
straints it places on extrinsic intent
evidence, have never seemed greater.
A close reading of the document is
much cheaper and probably more
accurate. IS
I "The key provision states: "[The insurer] will
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall be legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property
damage to which this policy applies, caused
by an occurrence." " 'Bodily injury' means
bodily injury, sickness or disease, sustained
by any person which occurs during the policy
period, including death at any time result
therefrom. "
"The case, still mired at the trial level, is
styled" Judicial Counsel Coordination Pro­
ceeding: Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases
no. 1072." It involves about 100 insurers and
75 manufacturers.
15It does not augur well, however, to note
The result of all this seems clear.
Substantive rules first allow the
number of relevant parties to prolif­
erate; thereafter they make the
liability of each rest upon uncertain
standards. The impact on litigation
is as expected: these rules create
incentives for its increase. In some
of these cases added to the system,
the costs in litigation may be justi­
fied by the superior social outcomes
that they produce. But as the costs
of litigation are in themselves dead­
weight social losses, the improve­
ment they make in the human condi­
tion must be very large to justify
their expense. Here the path of
reform is to undo much of the need­
less complexity of modern litiga­
tion. Yet this Can only be done by
the legal profession that itself is the
maj or beneficiary of the modern
changes, each of which may have
appeared commendable standing
alone, but which are oppressive in
combination. Good procedural
rules can serve as a welcome break
on complex substantive legal
theories. Sound substantive rules
can reduce strains on unsound pro­
cedural rules. The elimination of
personal vices is quite beyond our
power. But complex substance and
cumbersome procedure are institu­
tional vices for which cures are both
necessary and possible. •
that to date there are five separate opinions
on the proper meaning of the standard
clause, each of which has adapted a different
construction. The details of which are not
relevant to the central point.
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Harvard President Derek C.
Bok made in his 1983 report to
his Board of Overseers can be sum­
marized as follows: the U.S. econ­
omy suffers from a massive diver­
sion of talented people into the field
of law where they often add little to
the growth of the economy, the pur­
suit of culture, or the enhancement
of the human spirit; legal rules pro­
liferate, lawsuits abound, and the
costs of legal services grow faster
than the cost of living; for the
majority of citizens, legal rights are
constrained by prohibitive costs,
baffling complication of rules and
procedures, and long, frustrating
delays in court proceedings; and no
one cares about the coherent opera­
tion of the entire legal system or
worries whether the different parts
fit together in a coordinated whole.
President Bok reportedly called on
law schools "to expand research
and teaching about the system of
justice, to train students less for
combatand more for conciliation,
and to seek ways of providing legal
Mr. Tsubota is a partner in the
Tokyo Kokusai Law Offices. He
received his M. CiL. from the Law
School in 1967 and his J.D. from
Harvard Law School in 1970.
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services to the poor and middle
class."1
In making his points President
Bok referred to Japan, where law­
yers are said to be scarce and engi­
neers abundant, and he quoted the
saying that "engineers make the pie
grow larger and lawyers only decide
how to carve it up." His remarks fit
the prevailing myth that Japan is a
society "where lawyers are unim­
portant, lawsuits are few, and the
bureaucracy governs by developing
a national consensus. "2
First of all, the truth is that there
is in Japan a massive diversion of
younger talent into the world of
law. Every year more than 38,000
youngsters graduate from law facul­
ties in Japan as compared to 36,000
who graduate from U.S. law schools.
Since the population of Japan is
approximately half that of the
United States, there are proportion­
ately two times more law graduates
produced in Japan.
However, in Japan only about
500 of the 34,000 annual applicants
can successfully pass the National
Judicial Exam that makes them eli-
Ijames Vorenberg, Notes from the Dean,
Harv. Law Sch. Bull. (Spring 1983).
2 J. Mark Ramseyer, Japan's Myth of Non­
Litigiousness, Nat'1. Law J. (July 4, 1983).
gible to receive advanced training
for two years at the Legal Research
and Training Institute of the
Supreme Court of Japan. This train­
ing, which is somewhat similar to
that of the judicial clerkship in the
United States, is compulsory in
Japan. Only after passing a second
exam and graduating from that
Institute can one be admitted to the
bar or elect to become an assistant
judge or public prosecutor (the
equivalent of district attorney).
I t is not the deliberate govern­
ment policy to allow only 1.5 per­
cent of the applicants to pass the
Exam, as alleged by Mr. Ramseyer. 3
Nor is it the deliberate government
policy to limit the number of judges
and to create a large backlog of
court cases.' The true reason for
limiting the number of successful
applicants is simply that there are so
few judges that 500 students is the
maximum to whom they can give
individual training. (When Mrs.
Tsubota and I passed the exam in
1960, the number of successful
applicants was only 330.) It is note­
worthy that only a very few mem­
bers of the law faculty in Japan have
ever passed the Exam and received
the advanced training.
What happens then to the
unlucky 98.5 percent of applicants
who failed the Exam? There are
many categories of licenses for
various legal professions in Japan
other than attorney-at-law, such as
tax attorney, patent attorney, judi­
cial scrutinizer, and administrative
scrutinizer. Those who cannot pass
exams for these qualifications
simply forget about law and seek
employment at governmental agen­
cies and private companies. There­
fore, if legal education in the United
States is a waste of social resources,
it could be said to be much more of
a waste in Japan, where vast num­
bers of law graduates eventually
take jobs outside the legal profes­
sion for which they are supposed to
have been educated.
Yet it is true that lawsuits are few
in Japan. The most quoted explana­
tion of this phenomenon is offered
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
by Professor Kawashima, who
attributes Japanese non-litigious­
ness to lack of "legal conscious­
ness" in Japan. But as Kawashima's
theory is not accompanied by any
quantitative assessment of the
degree of "legal consciousness,"
this is nothing but his subjective
judgment. Another explanation
attributes the relative non-litigious­
ness in Japan to the country's bu­
reaucratic system. But Japanese
bureaucrats do not intervene in
commercial disputes except in spor­
adic instances. Many positive eco­
nomic studies in Japan also find
that the consequences of almost all
government interventions in one
form or another have been miser­
able failures; a typical example was
the "industrial policy" and "admin­
istrative guidance" formulated
under the Petroleum Industry Law,
which resulted in deep financial
difficulties for the Japanese petro­
leum companies and ended with the
admitted bankruptcy of that gov­
ernmental policy. Indeed, the
national consensus in Japan today
favors implementing the deregula­
tion recommended by the Committee
for Administrative Reform, a signif­
icant influence abroad of the
Chicago school.
In a tightly knit society like
Japan, each of the parties to a dis­
pute has good leverage against the
other so that negotiated settlement
is easier because in the near future
he or she may well be transacting
business again with the same party.
This appears to be a maj or reason
why there are fewer litigations, not
only in Japan or among overseas
Chinese but in most small and closed
local communities where people are
constantly dealing with each other.
In such societies, cooperation and
mutual assistance are more cost­
efficient than cut-throat struggles
for legal entitlement. It was Adam
Smith who pointed out that honesty
is the best economic policy in a
small community. S
A mutual exchange of favors can
also be a form of business transac­
tion in such societies," and in those
circumstances it would be insane for
anyone to require his or her trans­
acting partner to negotiate and exe­
cute precise, strict, and bulky docu­
ments. Certainly one would be better
off in such a society if one forgot
"This remark of Adam Smith is quoted by
Edward C. Banfield, in Corruption as a
Feature ofGovernmental Organization, 18 J.
Law & Econ. 603 (1975). He notes that
"mutual adherence to rules constitutes a
public good."
60n this subject an interesting analysis is
made by Professor Posner; see, Richard
Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society with
Special Reference to Primitive Law, 23 J.
Law & Econ. 1 (1980). In my view, however,
mutual exchange of gratuities _ in such a
society equals business transactions in the
exchange economy where an individual trans­
action is singled out from the entire socio­
economic context and arms-length negotia­
tion is made without material consideration
to a possibility of other unrelated trans­
actions in the future. Whether or not and to
what extent people treat each transaction as
an isolated and independent deal depends
upon the degree of expectations as to how
closely they will be transacting business with
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about legal niceties and stringencies,
but economic calculations in the
exchange economy still prevail in a
different form of bargain. A differ­
ent style of "legal consciousness" is
developed on the basis of social
sanctions that allow fluid and vague
contractual arrangements to be car­
ried through by crediting and debit­
ing exchange of reciprocal favors in
an overall social context. This ex-




prevail even if legal
education were directed
more at conciliation and
less at combat. "
change is not unique to oriental
communities-one can observe the
same phenomena in rural parts of
Europe and America, and people
prefer this way of life simply be­
cause it is economical in such soci­
eties to reduce transaction costs.
If people do not sue each other, it
is not because of lack of "legal con­
sciousness" or because of legal or
administrative barriers but simply
because other, more cost-efficient
alternatives are available. Con­
versely, if the lawsuit were the most
cost-efficient way to settle disputes,
conciliation would not prevail even
each other in the foreseeable future. The
tendency. that serious disputes often break
out when continuative contracts are termi­
nated in fact indicates that so long as a
contract for continuous transactions remains
in effect people tend to settle their problems
thereunder by mutual exchange of favors.
The points in question are: why it is easier for
people to work out amicable settlements in
such circumstances and, then, why they pre­
fer to do so? My answer to the first question
is the availability of mutual leverage and to
the second question, nothing but cost
efficiency. I explored this subject in my
recent book, Kokusaikbsho to Keiyakugi­
jutsu (International Negotiation and Arts of
Contract), published by Oriental Economists,
Ltd.
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if legal education were directed
more at conciliation and less at com­
bat. In this respect, however, a dif­
ference of legal systems affects
people's election of alternatives,
particularly between lawsuit and
voluntary settlement, and this offers
another explanation of why lawsuits
are not abundant in Japan.
First, the rules on damages and
the degree of the burden of proof
for establishing actual damages as
required by the Japanese courts in
practice are comparatively severe
and no punitive damages are
granted, whereas under the jury sys­
tem in the United States damages
(both actual and punitive) are
awarded more liberally in terms of
the scope and burden of proof, and
lawsuits have become an exciting
investment. Where recoverable
amounts and the chance of success
are smaller, reasonable cost-benefit
analysis directs that there should be
fewer litigations. This assumption is
proved by the fact that as the Japan­
ese courts started awarding larger
damages in automobile accident
cases in the 1960' s, the number of
litigations on automobile accidents
increased significantly. In Hong
Kong, victims of automobile acci­
dents can recover very little, and liti­
gations are therefore still scarce.
Another interesting phenomenon
is that after the court cases estab­
lished clear standards as to recover­
able damages in Japan the number
of litigations declined. An obvious
explanation for this phenomenon is
that clear rules of law make litiga­
tion less speculative and the cost­
benefit analysis applies more ration­
ally, which in turn makes economic
calculation in negotiated settlement
easier and more rational. In tort
cases, common law rules of contrib­
utory negligence (as opposed to civil
law rules of comparative negligence)
may make a further difference be­
cause defendants always have a
chance of paying nothing by prov­
ing the victim's negligence, and they
would be reluctant to settle until dis­
covery fails to produce evidence
indicating the victim's negligence.
Japanese lawyers can advise
clients: "Well, you may recover by
lawsuit at least $100,000, but in all
likelihood not more than $180,000,
and the amount will be reduced by
the degree of your negligence, if
any, proportionate to that of the
defendant's negligence. By the way,
our legal fees may exceed $50,000 if
the court proceedings take 3 years."
The client will then ponder and cal­
culate that an immediate cash pay­
ment of $100,000 could be a very
good settlement. In contrast, how­
ever, American attorneys must
advise clients: "You will get nothing
if found to be negligent, but if you
are lucky enough to draw heavily
upon the sympathy of the jurors you
might be able to get $100,000,000 or
$200,000,000 as punitive damages, I
just don't know." Even the least
self-serving of litigants could
become extremely discouraged or
wildly excited by this sort of advise­
ment. I might add another differ­
ence in the Japanese judicial system:
Plaintiffs must pay a small percent­
age of stamp duties on the amount
claimed in the complaint, so that a
favorite American practice of
adding three more zeros in alleging
the amount of damages in com­
plaints could not be followed in
Japan. Also, attorneys' retainer fees
are linked in Japan with the amount
of payment claimed (usually five to
fifteen percent depending upon the
amount claimed and the complexity
of the case). These charges naturally
compel the parties first to explore
the possibility of a settlement sin­
cerely. However, lacking such
stamp duty and given a possibility
that jurors might be influenced by
the amount of damages claimed in a
complaint, the favorite American
game of playing figures is a natural
result and makes rational settlement
rather difficult.
This point can be advanced more
generally: In countries like Ger­
many, France, Switzerland and
Japan where laws are systematically
codified, it is relatively easy for law­
yers to draw legal answers. But
under the common law system law­
yers must search and consult with
cases; and given conflicting cases
there is larger room for argument.
This means that under the Code sys­
tems fewer lawyers are needed to
perform the same social function.
There is smaller room for argument
and, therefore, fewer lawsuits fol­
low. Although common law rules
developed by cases are efficient
from the viewpoint of the economic
effect in the allocation of resources,
as persuasively argued by Professor
Posner,' the common law system is
less efficient from the viewpoint of
information retrieval and clarity of
legal standards. From this angle by
all likelihood one can assess that the
Uniform Commercial Code has re­
duced transaction costs and con­
tributed to the growth of the econ­
omy, although details of the Code
provisions have to be supplemented
by case laws.
From the economic viewpoint,
the cost of litigation is part of a
transaction cost consisting of the
cost of searching for information,
the cost of error (losing the case),
the expenses of legal proceedings,
and the opportunity loss to be in­
curred by the lapse of time (as
opposed to quick recovery by nego­
tiated settlement). An additional
cost a litigant must pay is the dam­
age done to his reputation in a com­
munity by the filing of a lawsuit.
This price is relatively higher in
Japan and China, where litigation
has traditionally been deemed a
crazy business. The cost-benefit
analysis regarding litigation should
include this intangible price, and
where the total cost is higher than
any gain could be, amicable settle­
ment of disputes should be encour­
aged.
President Bok's most serious alle­
gation is that lawyers often add little
to the growth of the economy. If
that is the case, then traditional
jurisprudence and legal education
should be blamed for having not
fully explored what a rule of law
would mean in real terms and in the
context of the entire chain of causa­
tion. Economic analysis of law is a
meaningful attempt to cure such
defects in legal analysis. For
instance, under the narrow and
short-sighted logic of traditional
legal analysis it has been considered
that rent control should work to the
betterment of poor tenants and that
the minimum wage should protect
unskilled workers. Now we know
"See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law, 2nd ed. (1977), 417; Also see,
Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes and
Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. Legal Stud. 431
(1980).
that this does not necessarily occur
and numerous studies published by
the Journal of Law and Economics
and the Journal of Legal Studies
teach us that many basic assump­
tions about causation taken for
granted in the traditional legal anal­
yses were simply wrong. The
"The economic analysis
of law is now
revolutionizing
traditional jurisprudence r :
and is bringing the study
of law to the level of
science for the first time
in our history. "
economic analysis of law is now
revolutionizing traditional jurispru­
dence and is bringing the study of
law to. the level of science for the
first time in our history.
This analysis should have a signif­
icant impact upon the lawyer's way
of thinking. For example, in the
negotiation of sales contracts, tradi­
tionallawyers representing the seller
usually try hard to narrow the scope
of warranties and to minimize
potential liabilities as much as pos­
sible. In doing so, lawyers feel that
they have fulfilled their responsi­
bility to their clients. But in doing
so, lawyers are in effect damaging
the marketability of the clients' pro­
ducts because few people would'
willingly buy a product carrying no
warranty if competitive products
offer effective warranties. George
Stigler has pointed out that
"prices" in the real sense include all
terms and conditions of the transac­
tion." An in-depth economic analy­
sis further indicates that a warranty
provision becomes optimal when it
correctly reflects the true state of the
product's quality."
"See George Stigler, The Organization of
Industry 296, footnote 1.
"See Leon Courville, et al., Warranty Scope
and Reliability under Imperfect Information
andA Iternative Market Structures, 52 J. Bus.
361 (1979).
However, the entire chain of causa­
tion in this instance is not yet
revealed in full. Under -the tradi­
tional economic 'analysis, trade-off
is sought between the 'cost for
improving quality and the corres­
ponding saving in the warranty serv­
ice cost. In this analysis the problem
is seen only from the 'seller' s side,
but the other side of the coin is that
product failure causes an additional
cost to the consumer' in terms of
inconvenience.. Therefore, if the
quality of a product is improved and
the rate of product failure is re- ,
duced, the consumer is willing to
pay such additional price as may
equal the . failure cost to be
incurred." The dividends from
improving quality will be threefold:
the net saving in warranty service
cost, a higher sales price, and a good
reputation in the marketplace. I I
Thus, in general the true price
equals the total cost to be incurred
by the purchaser in enj oying the
utility of goods, which includes
transaction cost, service cost, and
the failure cost, irrespective of who
legally bears them under what con­
tractual agreement. 12
In short, traditional legal analysis
does not necessarily make clear
what terms and conditions would
constitute the optimal deal, and an
elaborate provision disclaiming war­
ranties skillfully labored by tradi­
tional lawyers illustrates that nar­
row legal logic results in adverse
."
IOThe necessary conclusion of this analysis is
that manufacturers should spend cost in the
improvement of quality in such amount as
equals the total of the saving in their
warranty services cost and the failure cost to
the consumer.
I I Traditional analysis equates high quality
reputation in the marketplace with higher
sales price. But high quality reputation also
enhances the brand reputation and dispenses
with the consumer's search cost on quality, so
that market penetration is increased accord­
ingly. This will explain why manufacturers
placing more emphasis on higher quality
become the eventual winners in the market­
place, particularly where the geographic
market is larger.
121n the traditional economic theories regard­
ing cost-price equation, transactions cost, as
well as failure cost to the consumer, has not
been included in the definition of "cost." But
what does matter to consumers is the total
cost of the utility they purchase, because
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economic consequences to the win­
ning party. It also indicates that
conciliation cannot be a meaningful
alternative to combat without eco­
nomic analysis of the entire chain of
causation. Another example is the
Trust Indenture Act of New York
that prohibits trustees from dis­
claiming liabilities for their negli­
gence. This appears to be a reason­
able measure, but it is the law of
economy, as well discussed in the
famous treatise Risk, Uncertainty
and Profit by Frank Knight, that
profitable opportunities accompany
higher risks. Thus, the prudent-man
rule compulsorily imposed by that
legislation in effect sanctions that
trustees simply invest trust funds in
the safest manner, with the result
that the yields go down to a mar­
ginal level, and the real parties who
suffer are the beneficiaries whom
the legislation was intended to pro­
tect. It also lessons competition
among trust companies toward high­
er performance in the management
of trust funds and causes a decline
of the trust industry in the competi­
tion with securities firms that aggres­
ively hold out to achieve higher
perforrnance.
In conclusion, the problem is not
combat v. conciliation, but how to
achieve optimal transactions. Tradi­
tional legal education in the United
States trains lawyers as adversaries
what they purchase is not goods per se but the
utility thereof to be enjoyed at the place
where they use them. Thus, what does matter
is the total cost versus the quantity of utility
to be enjoyed by them, and the competition
in the marketplace lies in the total cost. When
the "cost"
.
is redefined as such total cost,
neo-classical economic theories have to be
restructured accordingly, as this total cost
theory has many significant implications to
the economic framework.
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in the combat of procuring the
largest piece of pie for their clients.
The foundation of that way of think­
ing is the approach of trade-off, and
the worst part of it lies in making
trade-off in a fragmented chain of
causation. Social and economic
problems can be constructively
solved, however, by the trade-on
approach suggested by Professors
Shultz and Dam.13 Actually, experi­
enced business lawyers quite cre­
atively devise contractual arrange­
ments that enable difficult trans­
actions to go through, and this
undoubtedly helps in efficient allo­
cation of resources and contributes
to the growth in the economy. Good
ideas in legal planning usually come
from the trade-on approach. But the
problem before us is that traditional
legal education has failed to develop
in an organized way the entire body
of methodology for constructive
problem solving through the various
legal techniques that" make the pie
grow larger" for the best interest of
the parties concerned and that busi­
ness lawyers must therefore learn it
through their practices. Legal
institutions and legal services in
general serve, and should serve, to
improve efficiency in business trans­
actions and the resulting growth of
the economy. Economic analysis of
law is a useful tool for this end and
helps lawyers to be problem shoot­
ers in creative ways of positive
benefit to the society. •
"See George P. Schultz and Kenneth W.
Dam, Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines
(1977) 87 ff. The trade-on approach applies
not only to legislation of economic policies
but also to contract negotiations, and more
generally to solving social problems.
Myths on the Midway
As
most of you know, the
honor of speaking at the
farewell lunch for the Visiting
Committee goes to the newest fac­
ulty member. Why this is so I do not
know. Maybe it is that, since by this
time you obviously know more about
the Law School than I do, I am here
to learn from you. Or maybe it is
because, since you have now met my
very impressive colleagues, I can do
little to damage your overall assess­
ment of the institution.
I understand you heard a talk on
law and economics from a fellow
named Easterbrook, who, I think,
may have discussed the theories of
that noted scholar, Easterbrook.
Also a talk by a fellow named
Epstein, who, I am sure, discussed
the theories of that other well­
known thinker, Epstein.
The one thing I am sorry you
missed is seeing these and other
knights of the intellect jousting at
our famous round table lunches.
Try to imagine the different talks
you heard-but speeded up, ampli­
fied, and all going at once.
Mr. Miller is Assistant Professor of
Law. He delivered this talk at the
farewell luncheon for the Law School
Visiting Committee on November
16, 1983.
Sometimes it is a little difficult to
get a word in edgeways. Come to
think of it, maybe that is why I was
invited to give this talk. It will be the
first time in more than three months
that I have been able to have lunch
and talk for. more than 20 seconds
without being interrupted.
What puzzles me is how our fac­
ulty members can debate for years
and years, yet they never seem to
convince each other. I listen to
Epstein talk about the Eminent
Domain clause, and it sounds so
intelligent and persuasive that I say,
"You' re right, Richard." But then I
hear Currie's views on the same sub­
ject, which although quite different
from Epstein's seem equally con­
vincing, and find myself saying,
"You're right, David."
One time Epstein overheard me
agree with Currie, and Epstein said
to me, "You can't possibly agree
with Currie because you just said
you agree with me and I disagree
with Currie." I thought about that
for a while, and all I could say was,
"You're right, Richard."
Another time we were discussing
the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes.
Richard ventured the opinion­
tongue in cheek, I am sure-that
Holmes, although brilliant, was
always wrong. I agreed-I said,
"You're right, Holmes was always
wrong. What's more, he was con-
Geoffrey P. Miller
stantly contradicting himself."
Currie broke in. He said, "Geoff, if
Holmes was constantly contradict­
ing himself, how could he have
always been wrong?" I thought
about that, and all I could say was,
"You're right, David."
For a while I was disturbed that I
could agree with people who vehe­
mently disagreed with each other.
But then I had a thought that com­
forted me greatly: the secret to con­
ciliating these disparate views is to
abandon the law of contradiction.
Let me explain. I have noticed three
things about the faculty:
first, they are absolutely con­
vinced they are right, no matter
how wrong they may be;
second, no two members of the
faculty agree on anything;
third, all members of the faculty
think all other members are right
about most things.
Being able to hold those three prop­
ositions in mind at the same time is,
I think, a key milestone in the edu­
cation of a Chicago law professor.
All this, as you have probably
guessed, brings me to the subject of
my talk about Myths on -the Mid­
way. A myth, as Bruno Bettleheim
would have told us while he was still
at Chicago and therefore smart, is
something that does 'not necessarily
obey the law of contradiction. In a
myth, something can be both A and
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not A at the same time. And that is
true of what I call the Myths on the
Midway-suppositions about the
Law School commonly shared by
casual observers.
What are the Myths on the Mid­
way? There are many, but I will
speak about just three.
First, Chicago is a rock-ribbed
bastion of arch-conservatism.
This myth is false. There are
many faculty members who believe
government has a role to play
beyond preventing force or theft or
safeguarding the national defense.
The New Deal has its adherents
here. Organizations such as the
ACLU have often received assist­
ance from members of the faculty.
But this myth is also true. Taken
as a whole the Law School is con­
servatively oriented. It is, perhaps,
noteworthy that no one on the fac­
ulty represents the extreme left of
the academic spectrum-the Critical
Legal Studies movement that has
become prominent at Harvard and
elsewhere. Chicago's faculty has
provided crucial intellectual justifi­
cation for Reagan Administration
initiatives in the areas of deregula­
tion, antitrust, and the like. Ken
Dam of this faculty is serving with
distinction at the State Department.
And the faculty has supplied Presi­
dent Reagan with two distinguished
judicial appointments- Richard
Posner and Antonin Scalia-and
may provide more before too long.
My second Myth on the Midway
is that Chicago is dominated by law
and economics.
The myth is false. The Law
School is a pluralist institution that
engages in and values all kinds of
intellectual approaches to law. Hans
Zeisel, Frank Zimring, and Norval
Morris have made important contri­
butions in the application of social
science to law. Geof Stone's valu­
able work on the First Amendment
has used a more traditional doctri­
nal analysis. John Langbein, Dick
Helmholz and Dennis Hutchinson
14 THE LAW SCHOOL RECORD
have added to our knowledge of
legal history. Cass Sunstein is work­
ing in the area of political science
and political philosophy. And my
mention of these scholars is not in
derogation of the important non­
economically oriented contributions
of many others.
But the myth is true. Law and
economics is very strong here.
Although Richard Posner is reported
to have another job, it would be
hard to tell based on his continuing
contribution to the school. Bill
Landes and Dennis Carlton, econ­
omists both, have done outstanding
research on the intersection of legal
rules and economic principles. Frank
Easterbrook and Dan Fischel have
been extremely productive scholars
in the area of corporate law and
economics. Doug Baird and others
have labored fruitfully in this area
as well.
My final Myth on the Midway is
that Chicago is a warm, intimate,
personal community ofstudents and
faculty working together in perfect
mutual respect and harmony.
False. That description fits a com­
mune, not a law school. Faculty and
students are certainly not colleagues,
and rarely become friends. Rela-
tions are usually polite but formal;
students' last names are often used,
and most students would quake be­
fore calling a professor by anything
other than "Mr.," "Ms.," or "Pro­
fessor." Noone ever accused the
Law School of being a particularly
fun place to be in the middle of
February.
But the myth is true. Where else
are entering students given a delight­
ful sit-down banquet with faculty
members? Where else do students
feel free to drop in, unannounced,
at any faculty member's office?
Where else do faculty and students
mingle over drinks every Friday at
wine mess? How many other schools
give the same personal attention to
students with special problems?
So, like all myths, these Myths on
the Midway are both true and not
true. The past two days have given
you an intensive look at us and have
enabled you to assess for yourselves
what the Law School is like. So you
can either agree or disagree with
what I have said, based on your own
experience. Or, perhaps, you will
find that you both agree and dis­
agree. That would please me,
because it would mean we have
really understood each other. •
The Law School Record is
pleased to' announce that Ger­
hard Casper has accepted reap­
pointment as Dean of the Law
School, effective July 1, 1984.
In announcing his reappoint­
ment to the faculty, President
Gray wrote: HI cannot imagine
better news for the Law School
or the University as we start a
new academic year.... Gerhard
has provided superb leadership
as Dean of the Law School and
as a member of the University
community. His willingness to
accept another term is of great
significance to all of us." Mr.
Casper joined the faculty in
1966 and has served as Dean
since January 1, 1979.
An Open Letter
from Dean Casper
To an Alumni Chapter President:
Dear Steve:
I am writing because you should know that you have had a disastrous
impact on my personal life: you, more than anybody else are responsible for
my decision to accept reappointment as Dean in spite of the fact that a return
to teaching and research was within my reach. The story of how you accom­
plished this feat I shall now recount, despite the great personal distress it has
caused me.
Among my disappointments in the first five years as Dean had been our
failure to arrange an early meeting with Law School alumni in your area. I
finally managed to schedule one last summer, but some unexpected develop­
ment forced me to relinquish my place to Phil Neal. I understand that the
gathering over which you presided was a great success for you and for Phil
Neal. For me, however, it was evidence of a dismal failure. It was reported to
me afterwards that you introduced Phil as "the Dean of the Law School."
Here I had worked so hard to fill the shoes of Edward Levi, Phil Neal and
Norval Morris-to name only those who are still busily looking, over my
shoulder. I had even succeeded occasionally in persuading Holly Davis that it
would be appropriate to include a reference to me in the Law School Record.
I had worked hard to establish a rapport with our graduates and friends. On
myoId, decrepit, three-speed bicycle, I had traveled all over the country to
meet alumni. Indeed, sometimes I felt that I had lost all the anonymity which
makes it possible to live inconspicuously and therefore freely. But you dis­
abused me of the notion that I had become a public figure. You made it clear
that my impact had been small indeed, and you accomplished all that by
omitting that attribute "former" in your introduction of Dean Neal. I
frankly cannot get myself to believe that you did it inadvertently.
As a graduate of twenty-some years ago, you might, of course, respond by
saying that the Law School should be pleased that you at least remembered
the dean who succeeded Edward Levi ("under" whom-as the quaint phrase
has it-you attended law school). You might also respond by telling me that
there was nothing to be upset about, since mine was the fate of all deans. You
might recount the story which Phil Neal told after hearing your introduction.
When Phil became Dean, Phil Kurland introduced him to some alumni
whom they encountered at a restaurant as "the new Dean of the Law
SchooL" This triggered the question: "Oh, what happened to Wilber Katz?"
It has always been clear to me that the lot of deans is a dismal one: while
they slave in the background, all glory is reaped by faculty, students, and
alumni. I suppose this is as it should be. Shortly after I became Dean on
January 1, 1979, a newspaper referred to Edward Levi as "the Dean of the
University of Chicago Law SchooL" I dropped Edward a note, asking appre­
hensively whether he knew something I did not know. His answer was: "If I
did, it would only be fair." While it may be fair to keep deans in the dark,
ignoring them altogether strikes me as a bit too much.
'
(cont. on pg. 16)
VOLUME 30/SPRING 1984 15
Be this as it may, the one thing a dean must know how to do, and indeed
must do, is to shoulder responsibility. Anything that goes wrong is his fault
anyway. Shouldering responsibility for the fact that I remain unknown in
your part of the country obviously meant that I had to accept reappointment
when asked by President Gray and the faculty: it will give me another chance
to redeem myself if the alumni would only read our publications and
communications.
Wilbur Katz, who was Dean from 1940 until 1950, liked to tell the follow­
ing story: "My last frustration as Dean was my inability to get the janitor to
clean the shelves in the office to which I was moving. Finally I resorted to
self-help and was proceeding through the hall with rags and a pail of water. I
passed a student who stopped short, wide-eyed, and said, 'God, there has
been a shake-up here!'
" But for you, Steve, there might have been a shake­
up this time around. Instead, at least for the time being, I am hanging on.




Gerhard Casper showing off his new bicycle, a ten-speed Peugeot given to him by Law School faculty and staff to
make it possible for him to tour the country even faster.
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The Visiting
Committee of the
Law School discussed current
issues facing faculty, students,
and administration during their
annual meeting November 15-16.
Chairman James Rhind, a trustee of
the university, opened the session by
describing the committee's goals as
seeking to understand the concerns
of faculty and students, and gaining
sufficient knowledge to serve both
as advisors to the administration
and as ambassadors for the Law
School to the world at large.
To this end, the program included
presentations on scholarships at the
Law School, with Professor Frank
Easterbrook speaking on "Trends
in Law and Economics," Professor
Richard Epstein on "The Integra­
tion of Public and Private Law,"
Professor Richard Helmholz on
"Legal History at the Law School,"
and Professor Cass Sunstein on "New
Directions in Administrative Law."
Professor Walter Blum and Law
Librarian Judith Wright discussed
the expansion needs of the library
and the Law School's future
building plans. The law library
acquires 10,000 new volumes per
year, and space in the present facil­
ity has become so cramped that
75,000 volumes are now in tempo­
rary storage in other parts of the
university campus. The school is
considering plans to expand the
library facility in the next two years,
and the Visiting Committee heard
about the options now being
explored.
An important focus of this year's
meeting was student concerns. Dean
of Admissions Richard Badger
explained the new Law School
Admissions Test. He then illustrated
the way in which the Law School
admissions procedures work by
showing how six actual (though
anonymous) applicants were evalu­
ated last year. The committee mem­
bers were able to talk informally
with students over lunch in the
Burton-Judson cafeteria, and in the
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Visiting Committee
1983-84
Mitchell S. Shapiro (J.D. '64), Ellis E. Reid (J.D. '59), John F. McCarthy
(J.D. '32), Anthony H. Barash (J.D. '68), and the Honorable Susan
Getzendanner listen to student presentations.
evening at the New Graduate Resi­
dence. In addition, representatives
from twelve student organizations
discussed their groups' activities and
answered questions about their
membership and goals.
A panel discussion of Harvard
President Derek Bok's 1983 report
to the Harvard Board of Overseers
examined his criticisms of the legal
system and legal education. Partici­
pating in the discussion, which
closed the formal program on the
first day, were Judge Susan Getzen­
danner, Professors John Langbein
and Bernard Melzer (who served as
moderator), and Mr. Lee Mitchell
(J .0. '68), President of Field Enter­
prises.
Phil Neal, Harry A. Bigelow
Professor of Law and former Dean,
was the speaker at a dinner for
members of the committee and law
faculty that evening. At the dinner,
Dean Gerhard Casper presented
James Rhind with a framed poster
to commemorate the completion of
Mr. Rhind's term as chairman of
the committee. The next day at
lunch Geoffrey Miller gave a talk on
"Myths on the Midway" that is
reprinted on pages 13-14. The formal
advisory program ended with com­
mittee members meeting in execu­
tive session with Dean Casper.
Visiting Committee Members
Chairman James T. Rhind








United States Court of Appeals
Portland, Maine
Wulf H. Doser '62
Baker & McKenzie
Frankfort am Main, West Germany
Susan Getzendanner
Judge





Harold L. Henderson '64
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio
Rex E. Lee '63
Solicitor General
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.
Richard L. Marcus '62
Adams, Fox, Marcus, Adelstein &
Gerding
Chicago, Illinois
Patricia Ann Patton '73
Judge
Illinois Human Rights Commission
Chicago, Illinois





Mitchell S. Shapiro '64
Shapiro, Laufer, Posell & Close
Los Angeles, California










Anthony H. Barash '68
Barash & Hill
Los Angeles, California
Dino J. D'Angelo '44
Friedman & Koven
Chicago, Illinois




Mayer, Brown & Platt
Chicago, Illinois
Steven J. Fiffer '76
Chicago, Illinois
Burton W. Kanter' 52
Kanter & Eisenberg
Chicago, Illinois
Peggy L. Kerr '72
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom
New York, New York
John F. McCarthy , 32
McCarthy & Levin
Chicago, Illinois
Mildred G. Peters '49
Peters & Peters
Northfield, Illinois







United States Court of Appeals
Eighth Circuit
Little Rock, Arkansas




Mayer, Brown & Platt
Chicago, Illinois
Roland E. Brandel '66
Morrison & Foerster
San Francisco, California
Peter W. Bruce '70
















United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
Dallas, Texas
Daniel P. Kearney '65
Salomon Brothers, Inc.
New York, New York
Anne E. Kutak '62





Joseph D. Mathewson '76




United States Court of Appeals
District of Columbia Circuit
Washington, D.C.









Isham, Lincoln & Beale
Chicago, Illinois
Robert G. Schloerb '51
Peterson, Ross, Schloerb & Seidel
Chicago, Illinois
Kenneth S. Tollett '55
Director




Roger D. Turner '76
Cravath, Swaine & Moore
New York, New York
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Publications
Qt the Faculty
The publications described briefly
below are a selection of recent writ­
ings by Law School faculty
members.
Walter J. Blum
Amortization of a Retained
Terminable Interest After Transfer
of a Remainder, 62 Taxes (April
1984).
Under our federal income tax
there are various types of assets that
cannot be depreciated or amortized
by those who own them. As might
be expected, the owners often seek
ways to put themselves in a position
to depreciate at least some of their
investment in these assets. Over the
years, the law has wrestled with
deciding what arrangements will en­
able depreciation to be taken. One
device that has been used by owners
consists of transferring a remainder
interest in the underlying property
while retaining a term interest. The
thought is that a term interest,
which expires at a predictable date,
can be depreciated. Under what cir­
cumstances should depreciation be
allowed when the remainder is
transferred? Mr. Blum explores this
question in his article.
Dissenting Opinions by Supreme
Court Justices in Federal Income
Tax Controversies, 82 Mich. L.
Rev. 431 (December 1983).
Over the years Mr. Blum has
come to wonder about the function
of analysis in dissenting opinions by
justices of the Supreme Court in
federal income tax controversies.
Not infrequently, he is unable to
discern how publication of a partic­
ular minority analysis can possibly
contribute to improving the opera­
tion of our complex income tax sys­
tem. Indeed, the analysis of a dis­
senter may sometimes cause need­
less confusion on the part of our
lower courts, tax advisors, and tax
gatherers. Mr. Blum's reflections on
the analytical dissenting opinions
that have been filed during the last
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five terms of the court lead him to
suggest a few guidelines for dis­
senters in writing opinions in
income tax cases.
Frank H. Easterbrook
Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26 J. Law & Econ. 23
(1983).
This article looks at "competition"
in antitrust law from a different per­
spective: competition among the
states. Mr. Easterbrook argues that
the Supreme Court's recent
attempts to apply the antitrust laws
to the actions of state and local gov­
ernments are both unnecessary, be­
cause these governments rarely have
the ability to affect people living
beyond their borders, and likely to
be counterproductive, because the
foreclosure of some forms of regu­
lation may drive state and local gov­
ernments to adopt other forms with
welfare effects inferior to those dis­
placed by antitrust. Mr. Easter­
brook argues that ultimately the
purpose of government is to replace
competition with something else,
and a federal rule requiring govern­
ment action to be "procompetitive"
has a potential to create a new fount
of federal review of state action
after the fashion of the substantive
due process cases from 1890-1930.
Richard A. Epstein
Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 553 (1983).
Blackmail is a crime with a unique
pedigree. On the one hand it is gen­
erally thought odious, and on the
other hand there is serious debate
over why it should be criminal at all.
Generally speaking, if an act may be
lawfully done, then the actor may
lawfully threaten to do it. Thus if A
may with impunity disclose embar­
rassing information about B to C,
why cannot A and B enter into some
agreement in which A agrees to
withhold the information in ex-
change for payment from B? In
other words, why not blackmail? In
his article, Mr. Epstein seeks to
escape this dilemma by showing
how the A and B agreement will
have as a necessary consequence the
commission of a fraud against C, an
element which is not present when A
simply discloses that same informa­
tion to C. He then explains why the
criminal prohibition against black­
mail is important even if persons
blackmailed are not willing to turn
state's evidence. The prohibition
makes it impossible for Blackmail,
Inc. to sell its professional services
to A as a means to extract greater
payments from B.
R.H. Helmholz
Adverse Possessions and Subjec­
tive Intent, 61 Washington U. L. Q.
331 (1983).
According to most commentators,
the state of mind of the adverse pos­
sessor of land should be irrelevant.
What should count is the accrual of
a cause of action in ejectment
against him. In this article Mr. -
Helmholz reviews the cases decided
since 1966, concluding that Ameri­
can courts do not follow this rule.
Instead, they regularly allow adverse
possession to ripen into title only
when the possessor is acting in the
good faith belief that he is occupy­
ing what he owns already. Knowing
trespassers rarely succeed. Mr.
Helmholz explores the· various
means judges have taken to reach
this result.
Diane Wood Hutchinson
Class Actions-Joinder or Repre­
sentational Device, 1983 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 459.
Ms. Hutchinson takes a compre­
hensive look at the Supreme Court
of the United States' class action
decisions and argues that two
models of the class action emerge: a
joinder model, in which the class
action functions only as an elabo­
rate joinder device, and a repre­
sentational model, in which it func­
tions as a vehicle whereby one (or
more) representatives may litigate
on behalf of unnamed class mem­
bers who have no independent pro­
cedural right to appear before the
court. After developing the history
of class actions in this country and
the policies that class actions are
designed to serve, Ms. Hutchinson
describes and criticizes the two
models in detail and suggests that
the representative model is more
consistent with both history and
policy.
Gareth H. Jones
The Recovery of Benefits Gained
from a Breach ofContract, 99 L. Q.
Rev. 443 (1983).
It is commonly said that the
object of an award of damages for
breach of contract is to compensate
a plaintiff for his loss; it is not to
strip the defendant of the profits
gained from the breach. Mr. Jones
argues that the defendant's gain has
on occasions influenced judges of
many common law jurisdictions in
determining what is the quantum of
the plaintiff's loss. But they have
not always admitted this to be so.
This leads Mr. Jones to consider
whether it is desirable, and if so
under what conditions, expressly to
recognize a restitutionary claim to
require a defendant to account for
profits gained from a breach of con­
tract. His conclusion is that there
are precedents to support such a
claim and that it is, at least in some
circumstances, desirable that it
should be recognized,
William M. Landes and Richard A.
Posner
Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime
for Catastrophic Personal Injuries,
forthcoming, J. Legal Studs. (1984).
Regulation and tort law are
alternative methods (though often
used in combination) for preventing
accidents. The former requires a
potential injurer to take measures to
prevent the accident from occurring.
The latter seeks to deter the accident
by making the potential injurer
liable for the costs of the accident
should it occur. In this paper Mr.
Landes and Judge Posner examine
tort law as a method of regulating
safety in cases of catastrophic acci­
dent (an accident resulting in serious
injury to a large number of victims).
They show that the problem of limit­
ing solvency may be overstated and
is perhaps more an argument for
using a negligence rather than strict
liability standard. The problem of
causal uncertainty and long delay
between accident and full-blown
injury could perhaps be solved by
moving toward a system where the
accident victim sues and obtains a
judgment before his injury is full
blown. This approach also has
attractions in dealing with the ser­
ious problem of giving victims of
catastrophic accidents incentives to
make "life style" changes that will
reduce the severity of the delayed
consequences of such accidents. Of
course, there are many practical
problems in making such a proposal
work, but the alternating regulation
has its own very serious practical
problems;
Bernard Meltzer and Cass Sunstein
Public Employee Strikes, Execu­
tive Discretion, and the A ir Traffic
Controllers, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 731
(1983).
Mr. Meltzer and Mr. Sunstein
consider the circumstances leading
up to the air traffic controller's
strike; the considerations behind the
prevailing ban on public sector
strikes; the history, constitution­
ality, and scope of the statutes
banning .strikes by federal employ­
ees; the problems of selective prose­
cution; and the implications of that
strike for labor relations in the
public sector and, incidentally, in
the private sector.
A. W. Brian Simpson
Editor, Biographical Dictionary
of the Common Law (Butterworths,
1984).
Thirty-nine contributors, includ­
ing John H. Langbein, Dennis J.
Hutchinson, and Gareth H. Jones,
have written entries for this concise
one-volume dictionary. It contains
lives of more than seven hundred
individuals, selected principally for
having made significant contribu­
tions to the development of the
common law system. Also included
are some civilians, all Roman law­
yers known to have worked in
Britain, and curiosities such as the
patron saint of lawyers. Although
the emphasis is on the English com­
mon law, numerous American lives
are included, ranging from major
legal thinkers such as Holmes to
such exponents of the deterrent
theory of punishment as Judge Isaac
Charles Parker of Arkansas. There
are many illustrations, and the
entries refer readers to further
sources to which they may turn for
fuller information.
Geoffrey R. Stone
Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 189 (1983).
Perhaps the most intriguing fea­
ture of contemporary first amend­
ment doctrine is the increasingly
invoked distinction between
content-based and content-neutral
restrictions on expression. Mr.
Stone explores the merits and limi­
tations of the distinction. He
examines four possible rationales
for the doctrine-equality, commu­
nicative impact, improper motiva­
tion, and distortion of public debate.
In the end, he concludes that the
distinction is more subtle than is
usually assumed, that there are
several previously unexamined types
of restrictions that do not fit neatly
within either the content-based or
the content-neutral category, but
that the distinction itself, if care­
fully defined, nonetheless serves a
legitimate and fundamental role in
first amendment jurisprudence.
Cass R. Sunstein
Deregulation and the Hard Look
Doctrine, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 177.
In this article, Mr. Sunstein ana­
lyzes recent developments in admin­
istrative law, with particular atten­
tion to the problem of judicial
review of deregulation. He concludes
that � in reviewing administrative
action (and inaction), the courts
have moved away from the position
that their primary role is to protect
private ordering by guarding against
unlawful government intrusions
into the marketplace. The courts'
new role is to ensure that agencies
have complied with the governing
statute, even if compliance requires
the agency to intrude on private
ordering. Mr. Sunstein also argues
that a number of judge-made doc­
trines attempt to guard against take­
over of the regulatory process by
narrow interest groups. He illus­
trates this thesis by examining the
Supreme Court's recent decision to
invalidate the Reagan Administra­
tion's repeal of the passive restraints
requirements for new automobiles.




Daniel R. Fischel was appointed
Professor of Law and Director of
the Law and Economics Program,
effective January 1, 1984. Before
joining the faculty, Mr. Fischel was
a professor at Northwestern Univer­
sity School of Law. Mr. Fischel
received his B.A. in American His­
tory from Cornell University in
1972; his M.A., also in American
History from Brown University in
1974; and his J.D. cum laude from
the Law School in 1977. While at
the Law School, he was a comment
editor of the Law Review and a
member of Order of the Coif. He
served as law clerk to both Judge
Thomas E. Fairchild, Chief Judge
of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, and Justice Potter Stewart
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Before
joining the Northwestern faculty, he
practiced for a year with the Chi­
cago law firm of Levy and Erens.
During the autumn quarter, 1984
Mary Ann Glendon will return to
the Law School as Visiting Profes­
sor of Law. Ms. Glendon was a
Visiting Professor at the Law
School during the autumn quarter
of 1983. Since 1968 she has served
on the law faculty of Boston Col­
lege, and she is the author of many
books and articles, among them The
New Family and the New Property
(1981) and State, Law and !,am�ly
(1977). A graduate of the University
of Chicago (B.A., 1959; J.D., 1961;
M.C.L., 1963), she was with the
firm of Mayer, Brown and Platt in
Chicago before beginning her teach­
ing career.
Joseph Isenbergh has been pro­
moted to Professor of Law. Mr.
Isenbergh teaches courses on federal
taxation, foreign and international
taxation, and civil procedure. He
received his A.B. in 1966 from
Columbia College, his A.M. in
French and comparative literature
in 1967 from the University of
Rochester, and his J.D. in 1976
from Yale University where he was
articles editor for the Yale Law
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Journal. Before joining the Law
School faculty in 1980, he was
associate in tax practice with the
Washington, D.C. firm of Caplan
and Drysdale.
The Director of the Mandel Legal
Aid Clinic, Gary H. Palm, was pro­
moted to Professor of Law in
September. Mr. Palm attended
Wittenberg University (A.B., 1964)
and the Law School (J.D., 1967)
where he was elected to Order of the
Coif. He came to the Law School as
director of the Clinic in 1970 after
being an associate at the Chicago
law firm of Schiff, Hardin, Waite,
Dorschel and Britton.
FACULTY NOTES
Professor Dennis Carlton gave
seminars on "Insider Trading" at
Columbia Law School in November
and on "The Effect of Inflation on
Futures Markets" at Columbia
Business School in December.
By invitation of the J ohn �.
Kennedy Institute at the Free Um­
versity of Berlin, Gerhard Casper,
William B. Graham Professor of
Law and Dean of the Law School,
gave a lecture on "The United
States and Germany: A Lawyer's
Perspective" at a symposium that
concluded the celebration of three
hundred years of German emigra­
tion to the United States. The con­
ference was held in December. Dean
Casper also spoke at the Mid-year
Meeting of the American Bar
Association, held in Las Vegas in
February, on "Too Much Law and
Too Many Lawyers," a response to
Derek Bok's remarks on the state of
the legal profession. He addressed
the same subject at the March meet­
ing of the Loop Luncheon series
sponsored by the Chicago chapter of
the National Alumni Association.
Kenneth Dam, Harold J. and
Marion F. Green Professor in Inter­
national Legal Studies currently
serving as Deputy Secretary of
State, and Gidon Gottlieb, Leo
Spitz Professor of International
Law and Diplomacy, have been
elected to membership in the
Council on Foreign Relations in
New York.
In September Professor Frank
Easterbrook spoke to a forum of the
American Corporate Counsel Asso­
ciation on the American Law Insti­
tute's corporate governance project,
discussing the evidence about the
extent of managers' discretion. In
October he presented papers on the
economics of criminal procedure to
a meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools and on in­
sider trading to the faculty of the
Boston University Law School. In
November he attended a symposium
at the University of Virginia on the
fiftieth anniversary of the securities
laws with Professor Daniel Fischel.
They presented a paper on "Manda­
tory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors" (to be published in the
May 1984 University oj Virginia
Law Review) that discusses the
extent to which rules compelling dis­
closures will help investors. He also
delivered a speech on the SEC's
Advisory Committee on Tender
Offers to a meeting of the Associa­
tion for Corporate Growth. Mr.
Easterbrook participated in a panel
discussion of vertical restraints
under the antitrust law sponsored by
the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington in December and pre­
sented a paper on mandatory dis­
closure at the Yale Legal Theory
Workshop in February. In March he
was part of a panel discussing anti­
trust at a seminar sponsored by The
Conference Board, he debated
Representative Jon Seiberling on
restricted distribution before a
plenary session of the ABA section
on antitrust law, and he participated
in an antitrust symposium spon­
sored by the FTC.
Richard Epstein, James Parker
Hall Professor of Law, attended the
Hoover Institution Conference on
Mass Torts and Catastrophic
Injuries where he presented a paper
on "Legal and Insurance Dynamics
of Mass Tort Litigation" (to be
published in the Journal oj Legal
Studies). He also presented a paper
called "Toward a Revitalization of
the Contract Clause" at the Univer-
sity of San Diego Conference on
Economic Liberties and the Consti­
tution and gave a talk "In Defense
of the Contract at Will" at the Uni­
versity of Chicago Conference on
Conceptual Foundations of Labor
Law. Both papers will be published
in future volumes of The University
ofChicago LawReview. In February
Mr. Epstein gave a speech entitled
"A Kind Word for Lochner" at
both the Yale Law School and
Columbia Law School; he spoke
about "Reflections on Legal Educa­
tion" at the Federalist Society Con­
vention held at Harvard Law
School; and he presented a paper on
the revitalization of the contract
clause at a Boston University Law
School workshop.
Professor R.H. Helmholz; Director
of the Legal History Program,
spoke on "The History of the Law
of Usury" at the annual meeting of
the American Society for Legal
History, held in Baltimore during
the month of October. In February
he delivered a lecture at Princeton
University on the research he did
last summer in the archives of Bar­
celona on the comparative history
of English and Spanish legal sys­
tems. During the spring Mr. Helm­
holz traveled to two international
meetings to discuss the development
of Continental and Anglo-American
law. One conference at Oxford dealt
with the law of contract and the
other, which took place in Cologne,
was on the law of libel and slander.
Visiting Professor of Law Gareth
Jones gave the second annual Lurcy
Lecture at the University of Chicago
in May 1983. His topic was "The
Lawyer in Public Life in Nineteenth
Century England." Mr. Jones spent
July as a visiting professor at the
University of Michigan Law School
and in the autumn was a visiting
professor at the University of
Georgia, where he taught courses in
restitution and contracts. He also
gave two papers at the Association
of American Law Schools meeting
in San Francisco in January, one in
the section on remedies and one in
the section on legal history. Mr.
Jones is the Downing Professor of




Four years after beginning his teach­
ing career as Assistant Professor in
the Law School, Douglas G. Baird
has been appointed Professor of
Law and Associate Dean. Mr. Baird
teaches courses in commercial law,
bankruptcy, and intellectual prop­
erty (copyright, patents, and trade­
marks). His casebook on security
interests in personal property, co­
edited with Thomas Jackson of
Stanford Law School, was published
by Foundation Press in November,
and he is currently working with
Mr. Jackson on a new casebook that
explores the effects of the 1979
Bankruptcy Code. Mr. Baird received
his B.A. from Yale College in 1975
and his J.D. in 1979 from Stanford
Law School, where he was manag­
ing editor of the Stanford Law
Review and a member of Order of
the Coif. After receiving his law
degree, he served as law clerk to the
Hon. Dorothy W. Nelson and to the
Hon. Shirley M. Hufstedler, both
Circuit Judges, United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
During his four years on the Law
School faculty, Mr. Baird has noted
several changes, both in personnel
and programs. Said Baird, "The
faculty has gotten a "lot younger.
Forty percent of the present faculty
weren't here when Gerhard Casper
became dean six years ago, and
these new additions have made the
place more diverse and more excit­
ing. "
One recent program change Baird
thinks is especially significant is the
increased sectioning of classes for
first year students that was instituted
during this academic year. The civil
procedures class is divided into three
sections, and torts, property, and
contracts are each divided into two.
These smaller classes have allowed
first year students to get to know the
professors better and have made it
easier for discussion to be steered by
the dynamics of the class.
Mr. Baird understands his new
administrative duties to involve
giving unobtrusive assistance to the
Law School dean. He explained,
"The associate dean is not there to
set policy or change the course of
the school. One of our virtues in the
past has been that the Law School is
underadministered, and we don't
want to add an unnecessary bureau­
crat to a system that was working
well without one. The day-to-day
administration of the school is
already handled by a very capable
staff. But the Law School is going
through a number of changes that
will consume a lot of Dean Casper's
time, and I hope to
I
help by taking
on some of the special projects and
administrative tasks that need to be
handled by an academic."
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Phillip Kurland, Professor of Law
and William R. Kenan, Jr., Distin­
guished Service Professor in the
College.
Philip Kurland, Professor of Law
and William R. Kenan, Jr., Dis­
tinguished Service Professor in the
College, was co-author of "Cable­
speech" The Case for First Amend­
ment Protection, published by Har­
court, Brace, Jovanovich in January.
He was co-editor, with Gerhard
Casper, and Dennis Hutchinson, of
the 1982 Supreme Court Review,
published by the University of
Chicago Press in March 1983, and
his article "Is the Constitution
Dead, Too?" appeared in the
Winter 1984 issue of the University
of Chicago Magazine. In January
Mr. Kurland delivered a talk en­
titled "Easy Cases Make Bad Law"
to the faculty of Fordham Univer­
sity at their Faculty Dayceremony,
"Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime
for Catastrophic Personal Injuries"
was the subject of a paper presented
by William Landes, Clifton R.
Musser Professor of Economics, at
a conference on Policy Options for
Catastrophic Personal Injuries held
in the autumn at the Hoover Insti­
tution. He also presented two lec­
tures on "Harm to Competition" at
the ABA National Institute on Anti­
trust and Economics held in New
York in September.
In October John Langbein, Max
Pam Professor of American and
Foreign Law and Russell Baker
Scholar, addressed a gathering of
several hundred teachers of criminal
law from around the country organ­
ized by the AALS and held in Chi­
cago. He spoke on the ways of using
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foreign and comparative legal mate­
rials in the criminal law curriculum.
In November he participated in a
scholarly colloquium sponsored by
the Liberty Fund of Indianapolis
that drew scholars from several
disciplines to a three-day session in
Houston. His talk was entitled' 'The
American Founders' Sources on the
Structure of Government."
Mr. Langbein has published his­
torical contributions in two new
reference works. He prepared sev­
eral entries on eighteenth-century
figures for the Biographical Dic­
tionary of the Common Law, edited
by Professor A. W. B. Simpson and
published by Butterworths in 1984.
He also authored an essay on the
history of the law of torture for the
Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice,
published by Macmillan in 1983.
Bernard Meltzer, Distinguished
Service Professor of Law, is cur­
rently working on the third edition
of his casebook on labor law in
cooperation with Professor Stanley
Henderson of the University of
Virginia Law School.
Professor A. W. Brian Simpson's
current work includes Pornography
and Politics: The Williams Commit­
tee in Retrospect (Waterlows 1983),
an account from the inside of the
working of the English Home Office's
Departmental Committee on Ob­
scenity and Film Censorship and of
the fate of its report, which like that
of the U.S. Presidential Commis­
sion on the same subject was not
accepted by the government of the
day. His book Cannibalism and the
Common Law is to be published by
the University of Chicago Press this
spring. It contains a fuller account
of the historical background to the
case of Regina v. Dudley and
Stephens (1884), a shortened version
of which appeared in The Law
School Record, volume 27, Fall
1981. The book is timed to appear
during this famous case's centenary
year.
AdolfSprudzs, Foreign Law Librar­
ian and, Lecturer in Legal Bibliog­
raphy, contributed the lead article,
entitled "International Legal
Research: An Infinite Paper
Chase," to the Summer 1983 issue
of the Vanderbilt Journal of Trans­
national Law.
Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor ofLaw
During the fall, Professor
Geoffrey Stone participated in a
conference on Religion and the Law
sponsored by DePaul University's
Center for Church/State Relations,
and he presented a paper on "High
Theory and the First Amendment"
at the Midwest Constitutional Law
Professors Conference. In December
he met with the Miami chapter of
the National Alumni Association to
discuss "The State of the Law
School." He also appeared on the
CBS discussion program Common
Ground on December 18, speaking
on the "Operation Greylord" inves­
tigation of corruption in Chicago's
judicial system.
.
Assistant Professor Cass Sunstein
spoke on the equal protection clause
at the October Midwest Constitu­
tional Law Professors Conference
and on the courts' role in reviewing
deregulation at the October faculty
workshop at Northwestern Univer­
sity Law School. In November he
addressed the Columbia University/
National Science Foundation Con­
ference on administrative law and
political economy. His subject was
the role of the courts in reviewing
administrative action. Mr. Sunstein
recently published two articles:
"Judicial Relief and Public Tort
Law," a book review, in the Yale
Law Journal and "Politics and
Adjudication" in Ethics.
Mark Weber, Staff Attorney and
Clinical Fellow at the Mandel Legal
Aid Clinic, has been named to the
Lawyers Advisory Council for the
Disabled Persons Advocacy Divi­
sion of the Illinois Attorney
General's Office.
LAW SCHOOL NEWS
Kimball Receives ABF Award
The Fellows of the American Bar
Foundation presented the 1984 Fel­
lows Research Award to Spencer L.
Kimball, Seymour Logan Professor
of Law, for "outstanding research
in law and government." The award
was made in recognition of Mr.
Kimball's lO-year term as executive
director of the American Bar
Foundation, during which he
founded the American Bar Founda­
tion Research Joumal; his numer­
ous books and articles; and his
influential research on insurance
legislation and regulatory practice.
Spencer L. Kimball, Seymour
Logan Professor of Law
Mr. Kimball graduated first in his
class at the University of Arizona in
1940. He earned his law degree from
Oxford, where he was a Rhodes
Scholar, in 1949, and became dean
of the University of Utah College of
Law the following year. He was a
professor at the University of Michi­
gan Law School from 1957-68 and
dean of the University of Wisconsin
Law School from 1968-72. Joining
the Law School faculty in 1972, Mr.
Kimball taught courses in legal
history, contracts, restitution, and
torts, but for the past several years
he has concentrated on research into
insurance regulation. His book
Insurance and Public Policy won
the Elizer Wright prize in 1960. He
is currently engaged in writing a
comprehensive book on insurance
regulation discussing the, kinds of
regulatory activities needed involv­
ing investments, marketing prac-
tices, and other activities; the
corporate separation of insurance
from other financial services; and
pricing.
Mr. Kimball is the third member
of the faculty to receive the Fellows
Research Award. In 1976 it was
awarded to Kenneth Culp Davis,
John P. Wilson Professor Emeritus
of Law, and in 1981, to Norval
Morris, Julius Kreeger Professor of
Law and Criminology.
Tax Conference Held
The Thirty-sixth Annual Federal
Tax Conference of the University of
Chicago Law School took place
October 26-28. Designed for lawyers,
accountants, and others concerned
with problems of federal taxation,
the conference focused on tax issues
of current interest and included
both formal presentations and panel
discussions. Three Law School
alumni were among the speakers:
Sheldon Banoff (J .D. '74), Stephen
Bowen (J.D. '72), and Walter Carr
(J .D. '70). The proceedings of the
conference were published in the
December 1983 issue of Taxes
magazine. Howard G. Krane (J .D.
'57) chaired the Conference Plan­
ning Committee for the second year.
Planning for next year's confer­
ence is already well under way. The
chairman of the 1984 Planning
Committee is William L. Morrison,
and Walter Blum (J.D. '41), Wil­
son-Dickinson Professor of Law, is
serving on the Planning Committee
for the thirty-sixth year. In re­
viewing his long history with the tax
conference, Mr. Blum realized that
tax people probably assume that
next year's conference will be the
thirty-seventh yearly presentation
by the Law School when actually the
association is longer and its history
is somewhat more complicated. He
therefore wrote the following brief
account of the early years of the
conference:
"In 1948 the School of Busi­
ness of the University of Chicago,
operating in conjunction with
what was called the Downtown
Center of University College,
conducted the first Institute on
Federal Taxation. The Law
School took no part in planning
the sessions; indeed the School
learned of the Institute through
publicity in local newspapers.
Most of those on the planning
group came out of an accounting
background. It became apparent,
however, that many of the inte­
resting topics were legal in nature
and that heavy reliance had to be
placed on obtaining lawyers as
speakers. The School of Business
became pleased to have the Law
School cooperate in putting
together future programs.
This new association led to
changing the name of the presen­
tation to the University of Chicago
Annual Federal Tax Conterence.
For six years the cooperation
between the Business School and
Law School continued, but the
interest of the Business School
gradually tapered off as it became
increasingly apparent that the
dominant concern of the Con­
ference was with law and law­
related problems. In 1955 the title
of the. operation was changed to
read: "The Eighth Annual Con­
ference of the University of




thirtieth sponsored by the Law
School alone.
The early history might well be
explained by the fact that a signi­
ficant shift was taking place in the
distribution of federal tax work.
Prior to World War II account­
ants dominated the field. After
the war to an increasing extent
lawyers became interested in fed­
eral tax problems. It is not sur­
prising that management of an
annual federal tax conference
should reflect that shift."
Israeli Ambassador Addresses
Law School
Meir Rosenne, the Israeli Ambas­
sador to the United States, addressed
alumni and students of the Law




Middle East," focusing on Israel's
defense posture and policies in
regard to its mid-eastern neighbors.
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Russell J. Parsons Faculty
Research Fund Established
A $250,000 fund to support faculty
research has been established by the
Borg-Warner Corporation in honor
of Russell J. Parsons, who prior to
his retirement in December 1983
served as Senior Vice President,
General Counsel, and Secretary for
the corporation. The income from
the endowed fund will be used to
support faculty in specialized legal
research.
In announcing the establishment
of the fund, Borg-Warner Corpora­
tion Chairman James F. Bere
expressed the hope that it would be
"a lasting reminder of the pride we
have in Russell Parsons and the
pride and interest he has shown in
the University of Chicago Law
School."
Accepting the gift for the Law
School, Dean Gerhard Casper said,
"I cannot stress sufficiently the
importance of faculty research sup­
port at a time when it is especially
difficult to maintain high quality
legal education. Weare very pleased
that Borg-Warner Corporation has
chosen this way to recognize the
Russell L. Parsons (J.D. '42) with Dean Gerhard Casper
accomplishments of our distin­
guished and loyal alumnus."
Mr. Parsons graduated from the
University of Chicago in 1940 and
received his J.D. from the Law
School in 1942. He served as a Cap­
tain in the United States Marine
Corps Reserve. He later joined
Borg-Warner in 1946. Professionally
he was elected vice president and a
director of the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries, and presi-
dent of the society's Chicago
chapter. Mr. Parsons is also a mem­
ber of the American, Illinois, and
Chicago Bar Associations, the Legal
Club of Chicago, and the Law Club
of Chicago. He has served the Uni­
versity of Chicago as a Vice Chair­
man of the Chicago Gifts Commit­
tee for the Campaign for Chicago, a
member of the Alumni Fund Com­
mittee, and a member of the Board
of Directors of the Law School
Alumni Association.
Coase Prize Funded
The Ronald H. Coase Prize for
excellence in the study of law and
economics has been created through
the gifts of Junjiro Tsubota
(M.C.L. '67). The award is to be
made by the Dean of the Law School
on the basis of recommendations
from the editors of the Journal of
Law and Economics, the Journal of
Legal Studies, and the University of
Chicago Law Review. Ronald H.
Coase is the Clifton R. Musser Pro­
fessor Emeritus of Economics. He
joined the Law School faculty in
1964 and was editor of the Journal
of Law and Economics for 19 years
before stepping down in April 1983.
Mr. Tsubota is a representative
partner in the Tokyo Kokusai Law
Offices and is also an instructor at
the Institute of International Studies
and Training in Japan. He has dedi­
cated the royalties from his book,
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Kokusaikosho to Keiyakugijutsu
(International Negotiation and Arts
of Contract) to the fund, having
long been interested in the study of
law and economics being done at the
Law School.
Legal History and Legal
Studies Workshops Continue
The series of workshops in legal
history directed by R.H. Helmholz;
Professor of Law and Director of
the Legal History Program, and in
legal studies directed by Richard
Epstein, James Parker Hall Pro­
fessor of Law, continue to bring
distinguished scholars to the Law
School to speak on a variety of
topics. The legal history speakers
for this academic year have included
Stephen Presser, Associate Dean
and Professor at Northwestern
University School of Law; Steven L.
Hoch of the Drew University,
Department of History; Jennifer
Nedelsky of the Princeton Univer­
sity Politics Department; William E.
Nelson, Professor of Law at the
New York University Law School;
and Charles Donahue, J r., Profes­
sor of Law at the Harvard Univer­
sity Law School. The legal studies
workshops for winter and spring
quarters presented Albert Alschuler
speaking on "The Fourth Amend­
ment," Vincent Blasi discussing
"Pathological Perspectives and the
First Amendment," Charles Fried,
and Robert Prichard speaking on
"The Influence of Procedural Rules





The Honorable Susan Getzendanner
of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Profes­
sor Frank Easterbrook, and Assist­
ant Professor Geoffrey Miller
served on the panel that heard oral
arguments in the case of United
Business Forms, Inc. v. Bunker
Ramo Corp. in the semi-final round
of this year's Hinton Moot Court
Competition. The four finalists
chosen were Sharon Epstein, Andrew
Heaton, Colette Holt Irving, and
Fred Schubkegel; all of the class of
1985. The final oral argument will
be heard in early May by a panel
consisting of the Honorable Carl
McGowan, Senior Judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit; the Honorable
Harry T. Edwards of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit; and the Honor­
able Arlin M. Adams of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Cir­
cuit.
1984-85 Tuition Increased
Tuition for the 1984-85 academic
year has been set at $10,200, an 8.5
percent increase over the present tui­
tion level. The increase is largely due
to operational costs, especially
library expenses, which remain high
in law schools across the country.
The Law School will continue to do
its best to contain costs in non­
academic areas in order to help meet
priorities necessary to ensure the
quality of education.
In a memo to the current stu­
dents, Dean Gerhard Casper wrote,
"In the last few years, we have
devoted special efforts to raising
additional funds for student support
which are beginning to payoff, and
will mean that financial aid fromall
sources will increase more than 8.5
percent." He also assured students
that his decision to continue as dean
reflects his commitment to




The International and Comparative
Law Society, a student group that
organizes on-going programs to
present and analyze a broad range
of transnational legal issues, is now
in its second year. The society has
sponsored lunch programs, including
a series focusing on "Lawyers in
Business"; receptions for practicing
attorneys to meet with students; and
an International Roundtable discus­
sion. Activities planned for, the
future include international law
conferences, an international moot
court team, and grant programs to
enable students to study or gain
work experience abroad.
The group is currently engaged in
exploring the possibility of a new
student-edited journal on interna­
tional commercial law. Preliminary
research has led members to con­
clude that private international law,
particularly that related to inter­
national finance, commerce, tax,
labor, and corporate activity, is an
area in which the students and
alumni of the Law School could /
make a significant contribution. In
addition, the journal would further
the professional education of a large
number of students by offering
them the opportunity to engage in
legal research and writing. The
group believes that a journal focus­
ing on private international law
could be innovative, exciting, and
useful for students and practicing
attorneys.
The International and Compara­
tive Law Society would like to elicit
comments and suggestions about
their programs, as well as detailed
comments regarding specific
subjects and areas of interest for
journal articles. The members
would also like to invite alumni to
participate in the programs. They
plan to organize a Board of
Advisors made up of alumni, prac­
tieing attorneys, and government
and international agency representa­
tives. Interested alumni and friends
should write to James Roberts, III,
Joerg Esdorn, or Elizabeth Brown
via the Law School, 1111 East 60th
Street, Chicago, IL 60637.
Law Foundation Funding Up
The Chicago Law Foundation,
which was organized in 1979 to pro­
mote and support legal services in
the public interest, now has a
greater proportion of the student
body supporting its work than any
other such group in the country.
More than half of the current Law
School students are enrolled as
members. The group's 1983 funds
were almost double what they had
been in any previous year and
included contributions from several
Law School professors as well as
from Chicago law firms.
,
Funds are used to run the Alter­
native Perspectives Speakers Pro­
gram that brings to the Law School
attorneys who are using their law
degrees in non- traditional ways.
Recent speakers have included
Jonathan Rich (J .0. '79) of the New
York Legal Aid Society and Judge
Abner Mikva (J.D. '51) of the
Court of Appeals for the Washing­
ton, D.C. Circuit. The foundation
also funds a Public Interest Grants
Program that makes regular grants
to law students for summer or
school year employment in public
interest-related jobs. During the
summer of 1983, three students
received. grants: Judy Brudnick ' 85
worked for Greater Boston Legal
Services; David Luna '85 worked at
Cabrini-Green Legal Aid handling
criminal cases; and Bob Tate '85
worked at Albany Legal Services. In
previous years, students have
worked with the Lake Michigan'
Foundation and the Legal Assist­
ance Foundation of Chicago. The
group plans to make at least three
grants this summer, and competition
among the students to receive the
grants will be high. Although there
are now more funds than ever
before, there are also more appli­
cants,
Now There are Five
Michael Lazerwitz (J .D. '83) is the
fifth Law School graduate to be
chosen as Supreme Court clerk for
1984-85. He will clerk for Chief
Justice Warren Burger. The other
Supreme Court clerks for 1984-85
are Charles Curtis (,82), Michael
Herz (,82), Richard Kapnick ('82),
and Lynda Simpson ('82).
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Law Women's Caucus
Continues Activities
The Law Women's Caucus is a stu­
dent group designed to address the
concerns of women at the Law
School, serving as a support group
for women students and providing a
forum for discussion of feminist
views. This year the Caucus has
sponsored a variety of events,
including a seminar on resume writ­
ing and interview techniques that
brought women from Chicago law
firms in to talk with first-year
women about the interviewing pro­
cess, a wine and cheese party during
orientation week, and a series of
small dinners that helped to orient
first-year women to the law school
and provided an opportunity for
them to meet second and third year
students.
In November the Caucus brought
Cynthia Epstein, author of Women
in Law, to the school to talk about
her book and answer questions on
her research. This winter the Caucus
invited all women faculty and
administrative staff members to
Lawyers inLove, an original musical
comedy on life in the first year of
law school written, directed, and
performed by Law School students,
drew a large audience'at its single
showing February 17. Pictured
above are Sandra Day and the
Supremes, at right is Carmen
Miranda explaining the Miranda
rights.
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participate in a panel discussion on
"Women, Law, and Academia."
The group is also compiling infor­
mation from a questionnaire circu­
lated to Law School alumnae.
Later this year, Caucus members
will attend a luncheon with
University of Chicago Law School
alumnae to discuss career planning
and decision-making, and there will
be a panel discussion among prac­
ticing women lawyers regarding
their work in the legal field. The
Caucus will also hold a debate
among Law School professors con­
cerning judicial scrutiny of discrimi­
nation in law firm partnerships. A
similar debate last year on the Roe
v. Wade decision sparked extensive
controversy.
BALSA Brings Speakers
BALSA, the organization of
black Law School students, has spon­
sored a lunch-time speakers series at
the Law School. Recent speakers have
included Ellis Reid (J.D. '59), a
Chicago attorney, and Professor
Richard Simpson of the University
of Illinois who spoke on "Politics­
Chicago Style" and Cheryl E.
Gelzer (J .D. '80), an associate in the
New York law firm of Guggenheimer
and Untermyer, who discussed
"Women in Labor Law."
Class Notes Section – REDACTED 





Richard I. Badger, AssistantDean and Dean of Students
in the Law School.
Douglas G. Baird, Associate Dean.
Holly C. Davis, Assistant Dean for Alumni Relations
and Development.
Roberta G. Evans, Assistant to the Dean.
Gladys o. Fuller, Administrative Assistant.
Frank J. Molek, Assistant Dean and Director of
Capital Campaign.
Paul Woo, Director of Placement.
Judith M. Wright, Law Librarian.
OFFICERS OF INSTRUCTION
Ronald H. Coase, B. Com., D.Sc. (Econ.), Clifton R.
Musser Professor Emeritus ofEconomics.
Kenneth Culp Davis, A.B., LL.B., LL.D., John P.
Wilson Professor Emeritus of Law.
Aaron Director, Ph.B., Professor Emeritus ofEconomics.
Allison Dunham, A.B., LL.B., Arnold l. Shure
Professor Emeritus of Urban Law.
Stanley A. Kaplan, Ph.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor
Emeritus of Law.
Leon M. Liddell, A.B., J.D., L.S.B., Law Librarian
and Professor of Law, Emeritus.
Phil C. Neal, Harry A. Bigelow Professor Emeritus of
Law.
Sheldon Tefft, LL.B., B.C.L., M.A. (Oxon.), James
Parker Hall Professor Emeritus of Law.
Hans Zeisel, Dr.Jur., Dr.Pol.Sci., Professor Emeritus
of Law and Sociology.
Douglas G. Baird, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law and
Associate Dean.
Mary E. Becker, S.B., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law.
Walter J. Blum, A.B., J.D., Wilson-Dickinson
Professor of Law and Committee on Public Policy
Studies.
Dennis W. Carlton, A.B., S.M., Ph.D., Professor of
Economics.
Gerhard Casper, LL.M., Dr.iur.utr., LL.D., William
B. Graham Professor of Law and Dean.
David P. Currie, A.B., LL.B., Harry_N. Wyatt
Professor of Law.
Kenneth W. Dam, S.B., J.D., Harold J. and Marion
F. Green Professor in International Legal Studies.
(On leave of absence.)
Frank H. Easterbrook, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law.
Richard A. Epstein, A.B., B.A., LL.B., James Parker
Hall Professor of Law.
Daniel R. Fischel, A.B., A.M., J.D., Professor of Law
and Director of the Law and Economics Program.
Gidon A. G. Gottlieb, LL.B., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D.,
Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and
Diplomacy.
.
R. H. Helmholz, A.B., LL.B., A.M., Ph.D., Professor
of Law and Director of the Legal History Program.
Dennis J. Hutchinson, A.B., B.A., M.A., LL.M.,
Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor
in the New Collegiate Division.
Diane Wood Hutchinson, A.B., J.D., Assistant
Professor of Law.
Joseph Isenbergh, A.B., A.M., J.D., Assistant Professor
of Law.
Gareth H. Jones, M.A., LL.D., LL.M., Ph.D., Visiting
Professor of Law. (Winter and Spring Quarters.)
Spencer L. Kimball, S.B., B.C.L., S.J.D., Seymour
Logan Professor of Law.
Philip B. Kurland, A.B., LL.B., LL.D., Professor of
Law and William R. Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Service
Professor in the College.
Peter Landau, Dr.iur., Visiting Professor of Law and
Thyssen Fellow. (Spring Quarter.)
William M. Landes, A.B., Ph.D., Clifton R. Musser
Professor ofEconomics.
John H. Langbein, A.B., LL.B., LL.B., Ph.D., Max
Pam Professor ofAmerican and Foreign Law and
Russell Baker Scholar.
Edward H. Levi, Ph.B., J.D., J.S.D., LL.D., Glen A.
Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor and President
Emeritus.
Jo Desha Lucas, A.B., M.P.A., LL.B., LL.M., Arnold
l. Shure Professor of Urban Law.
Bernard D. Meltzer, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Distinguished
Service Professor of Law.
Geoffrey P. Miller, A.B., J.D., Assistant Professor of
Law.
Norval Morris, LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., LL.D., Julius
Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology.
Gary H. Palm, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law.
Richard A._ Posner, A.B., LL.B., Senior Lecturer.
A. W. B. Simpson, M.A., D.C.L., Professor of Law.
Adolf Sprudzs, Lic., A.M., Foreign Law Librarian and
Lecturer in Legal Bibliography.
Geoffrey R. Stone, S.B., J.D., Professor of Law.
Cass R. Sunstein, A.B., J.D., Assistant Professor of
Law and Political Science.
Judith M. Wright, S.B., A.M., J.D., Law Librarian and
Lecturer in Law.
Franklin E. Zimring, A.B., J.D., Karl N. Llewellyn
Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the Center
for Studies in Criminal Justice. (On leave of absence.)
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Neal R. Feigenson, A.B., J.D., Bigelow Teaching Fellow
and Lecturer in Law.
Aaron Gershonowitz, A.B., J.D., Bigelow Teaching
Fellow and Lecturer in Law.
Alan R. Madry, A.B., J.D., Bigelow Teaching Fellow
and Lecturer in Law.
Joan E. Ruttenberg, A.B., J.D., Bigelow Teaching
Fellow and Lecturer in Law.
Lorraine A. Schmall, A.B., A.M., J.D., Bigelow
Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law.
Debra K. A. Slade, A.B., A.M., B.A., J.D., Bigelow
Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law.
Robert H. Bork, A.B., J.D., Lecturer in Law and
Charles J. Merriam Scholar.
Leo Herzel, A.B., A.M., J.D., Lecturer in Law.
Glen E. Hess, A.B., LL.B., Lecturer in Law.
James F. Holderman, S.B., J.D., Lecturer in Law.
Howard G. Krane, A.B., J.D., Lecturer in Law.
Prentice H. Marshall, S.B., J.D., Lecturer in Law.
Stephen M. Shapiro, A.B., J.D., Lecturer in Law.
MANDEL LEGAL AID CLINIC
Gary H. Palm, Director.
Mark J. Heyrman, A.B., J.D., Clinical Fellowand
Lecturer in Law.
Jean P. Kamp, A.B., J.D., StaffAttorney and
Clinical Fellow.
Stefan H. Krieger, A.B., J.D., StaffAttorney and
Clinical Fellow.
Randall D. Schmidt, A.B., J.D., StaffAttorney and
Clinical Fellow.
Mark C. Weber, A.B., J.D., StaffAttorney and Clinical
Fellow.
Charlotte K. Schuerman, A.B., A.M., Social Worker
and Field Supervisor.
FACULTY FROM OTHER SCHOOLS AND THE DIVISIONS
Sidney Davidson, A.B., M.B.A., Ph.D., C.P.A.,
Arthur Young Professor ofAccounting, Graduate
School of Business, and Lecturer in Law.
Charles M. Gray, A.B., Ph.D., Professor of English
Legal History, Department of History and the
College, and Lecturer in Law.
Paul Meier, S.B., A.M., Ph.D., Ralph and Mary Otis
Isham Professor, Departments of Statistics and
Pharmacological and Physiological Sciences and the
College.
Sam Peltzman, B.B.A., Ph.D., Professor of Business
Economics, Graduate School of Business.
Margaret K. Rosenheim, J.D., Helen Ross Professor of
Social Welfare Policy, School of Social Service
Administration, and Lecturer in Law.
George J. Stigler, B.B.A., M.B.A., Ph.D., Charles R.
Walgreen Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of
American Institutions, Department of Economics and
Graduate School of Business, and Director, Center for
the Study of the Economy and the State.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES AND VISITING FELLOWS
Wayne A. Kerstetter, A.B., J.D., Research Associate,
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice.
Ben S. Meeker, A.B., A.M., Research Associate,
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice.
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Tom R. Tyler, A.B., A.M., Ph.D., Fellow in Law and
Economics.
James J. Zuehl, S.B., J.D., Research Fellow, Center for
Studies in Criminal Justice.
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